The Indus Water Treaty

The Indus Water agreement13. The Indus flows by the north westerlyerly of India and Pakistan. It arises inside Tibet from a holy lake cal take Mansarovar, the mouth of the lion. by and by rising in Tibet, the Indus electric arcs north-west amidst the Karakoram and the Himalayas. In Kashmir, the river crosses the Line of Control (LoC) and enters Baltistan. The principal tri thataries of the Indus in the west atomic number 18 Kabul and Khurram rivers, while its five main tri notwithstandingaries in the eastward are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers.INDUS BASIN RIVERS14. The British laid the foundation of the Indus Basin River body in the late 19th Century. The organisation did exist prior to the British annexation of the airfield but in a rudimentary form. The irrigation lucre constructed during the British rule, peculiarly after 1885, was based on perennial renders which led off from river-spanning weirs and nonchland whole caboodle. Vast areas which had remained inaccessible below the traditional irrigation system were brought under cultivation by this canal system. In the Punjab, two major systems of irrigation were poseedBari Doab and the Sutlej Valley throw up.15. In the 19th century, the British constructed most of what is today the worlds largest near irrigation system in the Indus Basin. However, the boundaries amongst the two states drawn in 1947 nonrecreational no attention to hydrology. Eighty per cent of the irrigated area was in Pakistan, but after Partition a large portion of the head piss supply systems for the rivers which serviced most of this co breathing outal area were in Indian-held Kashmir.16. Seeing that India and Pakistan were otiose to resolve this issue, the World margin offered its help. After 10 years of intense negotiation, in 1960 the IWT was signed by past Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub caravan inn and the World Bank.17. Originally programmeed as one scheme4, however, with the cleavage of the subcontinent in 1947, including the province of Punjab, the Indus system was also divided while the head contributes fell to India, the canals ran through Pakistan. With a view to attaining the most absorb out and satisfactory utilization of the pissings of the Indus basin and recognizing the need for fixing and delimiting the rights and obligations of for each one country in relation to the other , both states, as go against of the Indus Waters Treaty agreed to following trainings of the accord- infixed Provisions5of the Treaty18. There are four essential elements to the accordance ( articles of treaty attached as appendices). The first relates to the division of the weewees. The waters of the ternion western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan, and the waters of the three east rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) were allocated to India.19. The second was a financial support plan to assist Pakistan in cooking the vast replacement works (Tarbela Dam on the Indus and Mangla on the Jhelum in Pakistan-held Kashmir and the massive link canals) which were required to store and transport water from rivers in the west to the irrigated areas of Pakistan. India contributed about 20% of the more or less $1 billion (in 1960 dollars) required.20. The third element relates to use of the hydroelectric dominance of Pakistans rivers before they adjoin Pakistan. This was a major bone of careen in the negotiations. India had a legitimate desire to prevail the hydroelectric potential of Pakistans rivers before the rivers reached the Line of Control. Pakistan was well aware that the10backbone of its economical system was irrigated agriculture that was built around the natural flows of the rivers, and thus worried that its security would be somberly compromised if India built dkms which could alter the timing of water advent to Pakistan, especially from the Jhelum an d the Chenab. The compromise reached in the IWT was that India could use the hydro potential on the rivers, but that there would be restrictions on the tame storage that India could construct on these rivers, thus eliminating the possibility of the dekameters creation operated in a way that would adversely affect Pakistan.21. The fourth element of the treaty is the dis delegatee effect mechanism, which sets up rules whereby first recourse is for the Indian and Pakistani IWT commissioners to resolve potential problems. If this fails then there are provisions for external arbitration, either through a neutral intelligent appointed by the World Bank, or through an international court of arbitration.Treaty as Success Story22. The treaty is widely described as the yet institutional mechanism that has worked between India and Pakistan over the past 50 years. In part this is because of the intelligent concept of the treaty, but it is also true that it worked because for tenners I ndia did very little to develop the hydro queen resources on the Jhelum and the Chenab in Indian-held Kashmir.11Effects of the Treaty23. Positive Aspects for Pakistan. The treaty informed6Pakistan, permanent water supply for its canal system. The principal benefits were-(a) It helped Pakistan gain independence from India for ensuring its supplies by binding India to a formal international treaty.(b) The treaty helped ordain the flows of the Indus and its tributaries. About 80 percent of the total water is produced during the monsoon period July to September. repositing proletariats undertaken ascribable(p) to the treaty ensure water availability during winters and enhanced canal diversions.(c) It helped to revolutionize the agricultural sector.24. Negative Aspects for Pakistan. The negative outcome for Pakistan was the loss of eastern rivers and with this, land surrounding these rivers largely irrigated by traditional methods was adversely impact. However, this loss was com pensated by the construction of storage reservoirs, canals and diversions. The other drawback was the rise in inter-provincial discord, especially in recent years, due to reduced flow in the Indus.1225. Positive Aspects for India. The major benefits that accrued from the treaty to India were -(a) The treaty enabled India to harness the eastern rivers to its benefit. It helped in diverting waters to arid areas manage Rajasthan and develop irrigation facilities.(b) India could also build run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants on the western rivers and flood dictation storage facilities, though no storage facilities use up been built so far.26. Negative Aspects for India. The losses to India were -(a) Ceding western rivers to Pakistan hampered growth of Jammu Kashmir, as water resources in the state could not be harnessed.(b) Increased differences amongst basin states as they began contending higher allocation of water.(c) Absence of an exit clause in the treaty shut Indias options, though Article XII of the treaty provides for a pass of the treaty.13Resolution of Salal Dam ControversyCUsersAdminPicturesSALAL DAM.bmp27. After the signing of Indus Waters Treaty, the first dis displacee India and Pakistan were engaged in was over the construction of the Salal Dam by India on the Chenab River. Under the equipment casualty of the Treaty, India submitted its plan to the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistans approval in 1968. A run of- the-river7hydroelectric project, Salal was deemed crucial for the agricultural needs of the Indian Punjab and economic progress of the country. In 1974 Pakistan officially objected to the design of Salal project sway that it did not confirm to the criteria for design of such hydroelectric projects laid crop up under the Treaty.28. During the course of the negotiations, several options were discussed for reaching to a final resoluteness including resort to the arbitration procedure provided in the Treaty. Finally, India agreed to make round changes in the design of the jam including reducing14the height of the dam and to the permanent closure of the diversion canal after the hydel plant had been commissioned.29. The resolution of this dispute was hailed in both countries and is still quoted as a chemise of successful diplomacy over water sharing between Pakistan and India due to the concessions made under the Salal Agreement signed in April 1978.Challenges to the TreatyAlthough the Indus Rivers support the worlds largest irrigation system, the unused waters of the rivers, which now go to waste into the Arabian Sea, have an equally large useful potential. These could reclaim from the desert an area equal to that already developed. Another 26 million acres could be turned into smiling fields of wheat and rice and cotton nutriment for hungry and work for the unemployedShivananda, 1961 4-5, emphasis added30. Over the last decade this situation has changed dramatically. India has initiated a major program me of hydropower development across its Himalayan region. As part of this strategy, and in part to try to address the grievances of the Kashmiri people, India has constructed and is constructing and planning a large number of large hydropower projects on the headwaters of Pakistans rivers (the Indus and especially the Jhelum and Chenab) in Indian-held Kashmir.1531. Almost all the disputes over water that have arisen between India and Pakistan are about dam projects constructed or being constructed by one of the two parties. The negotiations over these issues involve divergent consults and interests, based on their interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. Under this unprecedented pressure, the IWT is creaking. The Indian perspective is that Pakistan uses the treaty to put an unending set of obstacles in Indias path. The Pakistani perspective is that New Delhi operates with impunity, and that the additive upstream water storage being haved by India constitutes an existential ban e to Pakistans security. The major disputes have been over the following projects-Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project32. The second challenge to the treaty came regarding the construction of the Wullar Barrage, as it is called by Paksitan, or Tulbul Navigation Project as termed by India. The dispute arose in 1984 when India began to build the barrage and navigational project at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on the River Jhelum. In 1986, Pakistan referred the case to the Indus Commission, and in 1987 work was halted on the project by India. The main point of dispute is that Pakistan views the project as a storage work while India claims that it is a navigational project.1633. These divergent positions are besides urged in the light of specific provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty. For Pakistan, the project violates Article I (11) that prohibits both parties from undertaking any man-made obstruction that may cause a change in the volume of water. Article collar (4) prohibits I ndia from storing any water on the western rivers. Further, sub-para 8 (h) entitles India to construct peripheral storage work on the western rivers only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acre feet of water. Pakistan argues that the quick water aim in the Wullar Lake is enough for small boats to navigate between Baramula and Srinagar, so there is no need to store additional water. It moreover argues that the dams storage capacity was 32 times more than the 10,000 maf capacity provided under the Indus Waters Treaty.34. India, on the contrary, contends that despite the broad principles governing the Treaty, India has been allowed, under authorized conditions, to construct a barrage in the light of Article 3 (4) conditions, which are enlisted in Annexure D and E of the Treaty. India views the project as an start to make the Jhelum navigable, not a reservoir.35. Controlling water for navigation is tolerab le under the Treaty. More than a dozen rounds of talks have been held to eon over the construction of this barrage but it remains the oldest and longest invariable water dispute between India and Pakistan.17The Baglihar Dam Issuehttp//wikimapia.org/p/00/00/52/34/74_big.jpg36. The differing views of Islamabad and New Delhi first came to a head after India started constructing the 450 megawatt (MW) Baglihar project in 1999 on the Chenab River. Pakistan believed that the Indian design violated the IWT because the dam accommodated gated spillways which meant that the manipulable storage was larger than that allowed under the IWT. The Indian view was that if they were unable to operate the reservoir more flexibly, it would rapidly fill with silt, as had happened in the earlier Salal project. The Indian and Pakistani IWT commissioners were unable to resolve the difference, with Pakistan asking the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert in 2005.37. The essence of the neutral experts ve rdict, delivered in 2007, was that the IWT had a provision for updating the implementation of the treaty as new knowledge compile what has emerged as global good practice for silt management would be18impossible with the rigidities of the treaty and therefore India should be allowed to draw water out of the dam at lower levels than those specified in the treaty.38. To agnize this interpretation a brief technical digression is needed. Water stored back tooth a dam is divided between live storage, which the hustler of the dam can manage through both gated spillways and power intakes, and lower-level dead storage, which the operator cannot manage as he does not have outlets in the dam low enough to release this water.39. The neutral expert, applying considerable semantic subtlety, basically argued that live storage was not the same as manipulable storage. He argued that only storage that could be used for the operational purpose of generating power constituted live storage. So if I ndia was creating more manipulable storage on the grounds that this was necessary for silt management, then, in the judgment of the neutral expert, this was not live storage and should be allowed. This finding would only make superstar if Pakistans concern in the treaty was to define exactly where the power outlets could be in the Indian dams (which it never was and is not). But it makes no sense if Pakistans concern was Indias capacity to manipulate flows into Pakistan (which it always was and still is).40. For Pakistan the (non-appealable) Baglihar verdict was a long blow because it reinterpreted the IWT to remove the fundamental physical protection (limits in manipulable storage) which Pakistan had against the creation of an Indian ability to nearly manipulate the timing of flows of water into Pakistan.1941. From the Pakistan perspective, salt was rubbed into this raw wound when India did not (in Pakistans view) comply with the IWT-specified cognitive operation for filling Ba glihar.The Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project42. Present flashpoint of Kishenganga Hydroelectric project in Indian-held Kashmir is grotesque. In India the westward-flowing Jhelum River has two main tributaries. The Union tributary, which flows at a warmly higher elevation8in the foothills of the Himalayas, is the Neelum River. The southern tributary, which flows at a much lower elevation, is the Jhelum itself. The two tributaries join just after they reach Pakistan. This odd configuration offers a unique opportunity build a barrage across the Neelum, build a tunnel down to the Jhelum, put a power station at the bottom and generate substantial amounts of power. There are two obvious sites where this can be through one upstream in India and one downstream in Pakistan.ALT.jpg (36381 bytes)2043. The engineers who drew up the IWT were well aware of these possibilities and stipulated that India could build its project only if there is no existing use which leave behind be affected in Pakistan. India is now edifice the eastern scheme (the 330 MW Kishenganga project) while Pakistan is building the western scheme (the 1,000 MW Neelum-Jhelum project). The immediate stakes and investments are large roughly $350 million in India and $1,000 million in Pakistan. Disillusioned with the neutral expert process after Baglihar, in May 2010 Pakistan declared this to be a dispute to be taken to a Court of Arbitration.44. The Neelum-Jhelum case is unique because it is the one case in the Indus Basin where there is an intrinsic fight between India and Pakistan. In all of the other cases upstream storage of water in India could, if normal relations pertained, easily be translated into benefits for downstream Pakistan. These benefits would include the more reliable timing of flows, storage of water during floods and perhaps dismantle energy sharing.45. The situation is further complicated by the fact that India has a series of hydropower projects being planned, designed and constructed on the headwaters of Pakistans three rivers which will name something like 40 days of live storage on the Chenab alone. From the Pakistani perspective this ability to hold and release water constitutes a serious threat to water security in Pakistan.21IWT Internal regional Problems46. Besides these dam projects, there are several internal and regional issues that strain the Indus Waters Treaty. The most important is the view of the people in Jammu and Kashmir who see the Treaty as exploiting9their rights by both India and Pakistan. People of the northern areas in Pakistan are also opposed to dam projects in Pakistan like the Mangla dam.47. Secondly, hostile anti-Pakistan segments in India view the Indus Water Treaty as cock-a-hoop undue concessions to Pakistan, which Prime Minister Nehru signed to purchase peace. Since it did not sire peace to Kashmir, they want to revisit the concessions given to Pakistan under the Treaty.48. Third, Pakistan also has serious problems regarding the sharing of Indus waters among its four provinces. This is evident with entrenched controversy being present in the country on every planned dam. The famine of water has deep political, economic and social effects. For example, farmers in Sindh point their fingers at Punjabi landlords, and accuse them of stealing their share of the Induss water.49. Finally, there are environmental and bionomical changes which call for consideration. Because of climate change, the Himalayan glaciers are melting at an terrific rate. For water resources, this means an increase in water initially due to22flooding. Within the next 50 years, however, experts believe there will be a 30 to 40 percent10drop in glacial melt because the glaciers will have receded. A strategy to create more storage capacity for water is the only option available, but one has to remember that glacial melt is not only water but also silt that will reduce the capacity of the reservoirs. This reflexion has not bee n considered at the political level or at to the lowest degree has not gained prominence.50. Essentially the following two features have shaped Pakistan-India water politics(a) The underlying concern of both states is the political feels that water entails. This aspect is believed to be the catalyst11behind the hydro politics in which both countries are engaged. Thus, the discussion on water issues has always been there in about every dialogue between India and Pakistan, and now it figures in the high level talks that reflects the dominance of water issues.(b) Most of the time, Pakistan being the lower riparian follows up on these issues on sharing of waters more vigorously. It has objected to almost all the projects planned by India on the western rivers calling them a violation of the23Indus Water Treaty. Nonetheless, India does not accept this view and takes defensive attitude positions.